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The Zanvyl Krieger Mind/Brain Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
A long history of studies of perception has shown that the visual system organizes the
incoming information early on, interpreting the 2D image in terms of a 3D world and
producing a structure that provides perceptual continuity and enables object-based
attention. Recordings from monkey visual cortex show that many neurons, especially
in area V2, are selective for border ownership. These neurons are edge selective
and have ordinary classical receptive fields (CRF), but in addition their responses are
modulated (enhanced or suppressed) depending on the location of a ‘figure’ relative
to the edge in their receptive field. Each neuron has a fixed preference for location on
one side or the other. This selectivity is derived from the image context far beyond the
CRF. This paper reviews evidence indicating that border ownership selectivity reflects
the formation of early object representations (‘proto-objects’). The evidence includes
experiments showing (1) reversal of border ownership signals with change of perceived
object structure, (2) border ownership specific enhancement of responses in object-
based selective attention, (3) persistence of border ownership signals in accordance with
continuity of object perception, and (4) remapping of border ownership signals across
saccades and object movements. Findings 1 and 2 can be explained by hypothetical
grouping circuits that sum contour feature signals in search of objectness, and, via
recurrent projections, enhance the corresponding low-level feature signals. Findings 3
and 4 might be explained by assuming that the activity of grouping circuits persists and
can be remapped. Grouping, persistence, and remapping are fundamental operations of
vision. Finding these operations manifest in low-level visual areas challenges traditional
views of visual processing. New computational models need to be developed for a
comprehensive understanding of the function of the visual cortex.
Keywords: visual cortex, neural mechanism, single-cell recording, perceptual organization, object files, object
permanence, attention, contour grouping
Poggio’s (1995) neurophysiological recording system, which he passed on to me when he retired
in 1993, allowed the experimenter to generate visual stimuli deﬁned either by luminance/color
contrast or by disparity (‘cyclopean’ ﬁgures, more precisely, dynamic random dot stereograms).
A cyclopean square, for example, would stereoscopically appear as a textured shape ﬂoating in
front of an equally textured background. One day I recorded an orientation selective cell that
responded to the edge of a cyclopean square (which had no luminance or color contrast) as well as
to the contour of a luminance-deﬁned square (which had no depth), and in both cases it responded
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selectively to the left-hand side of the ﬁgure, but not the opposite
side (I could place any part of the square in the receptive ﬁeld
by changing its position relative to the monkey’s ﬁxation point).
For a contrast-deﬁned ﬁgure this would be a trivial observation
because the opposite sides have opposite contrast polarity, and
simple cells are known to be selective for contrast polarity. But
this cell had the same side preference for the cyclopean ﬁgure
whose edges did not have contrast, but just stereoscopic depth.
With the cyclopean ﬁgure it seemed to be selective for the
direction of the step in depth, and with a luminance-deﬁned
ﬁgure for the contrast polarity of the edge. That the preferred
edge conditions were on same side for both types of ﬁgure might
have been a coincidence. When I encountered another cell that
again preferred the same side for cyclopean and contrast squares,
I ﬂipped the colors of ﬁgure and ground for the latter, and, to my
surprise, the cell still preferred the same side (although the edge
contrast was now reversed). Thus, it was not contrast polarity that
determined the responses. The preferred stereoscopic stimulus
was the edge of a surface extending to the right of its receptive
ﬁeld. Was it possible that the cell responded to contrast edges
only when they were part of a ﬁgure to the right of its receptive
ﬁeld? But how could it know that there was a ﬁgure? Through the
small window of its receptive ﬁeld it could only ‘see’ a contrast
border.
BORDER OWNERSHIP
Figures 1A–C illustrates this side-of-ﬁgure selectivity in a
cell recorded in the secondary visual area V2. The cell
responds strongly to edges of ﬁgures located on the left
of its receptive ﬁeld (Figures 1A,B, top), but hardly at
all to edges of ﬁgures on the right (bottom), and it does
so for light-dark edges (Figure 1A) as well as dark-light
edges (Figure 1B). Note that the edges in the receptive ﬁeld
are identical between the vertically aligned displays, but the
responses diﬀer dramatically. Apparently, despite the small
size of its receptive ﬁeld, the cell knows the edge belongs
to a larger object and that the object is located on the
left.
We have termed this ‘border ownership coding’ (Zhou
et al., 2000). Indeed, I was primed by the perceptual studies
of Nakayama et al. (1989, 1995), who showed that the role
of a contour in perception depends on how it relates to the
adjacent regions: the ‘intrinsic’ contours of a object contribute
to its perception, whereas ‘extrinsic’ contours produced by
other, occluding objects are excluded. For example, a face that
is partially covered by horizontal strips can be recognized
easily when the face is stereoscopically behind the occluding
strips (Figure 2, left). However, recognition is diﬃcult when
the visible parts of the face are stereoscopically in front
(right). In this case, the borders between strip and face
regions are grouped with the face regions, making them
appear as separate objects. In contrast, when the occluding
strips are in front, they own those borders, allowing the face
fragments to regroup behind the strips. Thus, the system assigns
borders to the side that is nearer, and it seems to do so
FIGURE 1 | Border ownership selectivity. (A–C) Responses of an example
V2 neuron. Rows of tics in (A,B) represent repeated responses to the stimuli
shown on the left. (A) The responses to the right-hand edge of a bright square
(top) are much stronger than the responses to the left-hand edge of a dark
square (bottom) despite stimuli being identical in the receptive field (green
ellipse, not part of display): the neuron is sensitive to the image context.
(B) Same as (A), but contrast reversed. Again, the cell responds more
strongly when the square is to the left of the receptive field: the neuron prefers
‘left’ border ownership. (C) Average time course of the neuron’s firing rate for
left (red) and right (blue) border ownership. Note divergence of curves right
after response onset (68 ms after stimulus onset in this neuron). (D–F)
Demonstration of the range of context integration. A V2 Neuron was examined
with edges as in (A), but with contour-defined squares where luminance
variations were confined to a narrow seam at the contours (D). The contours
were broken up into eight fragments (four edges and four corners); one edge
was placed over the receptive field, while the seven ‘contextual’ fragments
were presented randomly in all possible combinations. (E) The influence of
each of the contextual fragments on the responses, as determined by
regression analysis. Colored shading represents the regression coefficients,
red indicating enhancement, blue, suppression. Results are shown separately
for left and right locations of square, and for two sizes of square (3◦ and 8◦
visual angle). The small gray specks on the test edge show the map of the
neuron’s classical receptive field determined with flashing bars. The small size
of this near-foveal receptive field contrasts with the large range of context
integration: nearly all contour fragments to the left of the receptive field
enhanced the responses, whereas contour fragments to the right suppressed
them. (F) The result of presenting the same contextual fragments as in (E), but
without the edge in the receptive field: the contextual fragments alone
produced no response. (Modified from Zhang and von der Heydt, 2010.)
before the information is passed on to the object recognition
stage.
From the comparison of contrast-deﬁned and disparity-
deﬁned ﬁgures, as described above, it became clear that the
selectivity for side-of-ﬁgure relates to the process of interpreting
a 2-dimensional image in terms of a 3-dimensional world. The
disparities deﬁne unambiguously what is in front and what is in
back, and the occluding contours belong to what’s in front. The
contrast-deﬁned ﬁgures are ambiguous; the ﬁgure region could
be an object or could be a window through which a background
surface can be seen. Recordings from area V2 showed a clear
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the face recognition experiment of Nakayama
et al. (1989). When the face is in back, it is easy to identify, but when the face
strips are in front, the system assigns their borders to the strips, thus grouping
the face information with the horizontal borders, and face identification
becomes difficult. The illustration uses pictorial tools to depict depth, in the
experimental study depth was defined by stereoscopic presentation.
(Reproduced with permission from Nakayama and Shimojo, 2009.)
correlation. The ‘near’ side of the preferred stereoscopic edge was
generally the same as the preferred side for the contrast-deﬁned
ﬁgure without disparity cue (Qiu and von der Heydt, 2005). In
other words, despite the lack of speciﬁc depth cues, the cortex
interprets the contrast-deﬁned ﬁgure as a foreground object,
rather than a window or a region of diﬀerent reﬂectance on a ﬂat
surface.
To do this, the cells rely on the global distribution of contours
in the vicinity of the classical receptive ﬁeld (CRF). A closed
contour is of course strong evidence for the foreground object
interpretation. But even fragments of a closed contour can
suggest the presence of an object. Experiments show that, while
a contrast edge in the CRF is necessary to elicit a response, the
response is modulated by the presence of additional edges which
are compatible with an object on one side or the other. The role
of such contextual edges was probed by presenting fragments
of a putative object contour (Figures 1D–F). The contours of
squares were broken up into eight fragments (four edges and
four corners), one edge fragment was placed on the CRF (green
dashed ellipse), and the inﬂuence of the contextual fragments on
the response was determined. In Figure 1E, the eﬀect of each
fragment is indicated by the color of shading (results for two
sizes of squares are illustrated). One can see that most fragments
on the left (preferred) side enhanced the responses, whereas
fragments on the right side suppressed them. The plot at the
bottom (Figure 1F) shows the result of presenting the contextual
fragments without an edge in the CRF: there was no response.
Thus, the contextual elements do not drive the cell, their inﬂuence
is purely modulatory. The results of this experiment reveal
the large range of the context inﬂuence compared to the tiny
CRF.
One might think that neural border ownership selectivity is
merely about the coding of borders, adding a directional tag
to each contour segment. But further experiments showed that
the underlying process goes much deeper, and that studying
border ownership coding provides insight into the way the system
deﬁnes what is an object.
OBJECT STRUCTURE
The following experiment (Qiu and von der Heydt, 2007),
exploits the phenomenon of perceptual transparency (Figure 3).
While an isolated square perceptually owns its contour on all
four sides, one can take away the ownership on one side by
adding three squares to create a conﬁguration as in Figure 3A
(top). This conﬁguration is generally perceived as two crossed
bars in transparent overlay. Note that perception here assigns the
interior edges to the bars. Thus, adding the squares has ﬂipped
border ownership on one side of the original square. But when the
corners of the squares are rounded oﬀ (Figure 3A, bottom), the
four squares are perceived as individual objects and ownership
of the interior edges returns to the squares. The displays at the
top of Figure 3B show how ownership of the border marked by a
dotted ellipse is ﬂipped by the image context. In the experiment,
this border was placed in the receptive ﬁeld of the recorded
neuron.
The neural signals faithfully reﬂect these perceptual
reorganizations. For the single square, the border ownership
signal for the edge in the receptive ﬁeld is positive (black curve
in Figure 3B), corresponding to ‘right’ border ownership, but
for the transparent conﬁguration, the signal turns negative (red
curve), indicating ‘left’ border ownership. For the squares with
rounded corners, the signal is again positive (blue curve). Thus,
the border ownership signals reﬂect the way the brain interprets
the visual stimulus in terms of objects. Most of the neurons in
V1 and V2 represent local border segments, and the imposed
border ownership modulation shows how the cortex groups these
segments to contours of objects. This early contour assignment
determines the shape processing at subsequent stages (Bushnell
et al., 2011).
OBJECT-BASED ATTENTION
Why would the brain need to group features at this early stage?
One reason, we argue, is to provide a structure for selective
attention. Recordings from the visual cortex have shown that
attention tends to enhance responses in neurons representing
the attended stimulus compared to distracter stimuli. A popular
explanation is the spatial attention model which assumes that
attention enhances the responses at a single behaviorally relevant
location in the visual ﬁeld (‘spotlight of attention’). However, in
natural images, which are generally cluttered because 3D scenes
are projected onto a 2D receptor surface, a simple spotlight
of attention is of little use. The system is generally interested
in objects, not image regions, and to select information in an
object-based manner a structured representation is needed.
Recordings madewhile themonkey was performing a selective
attention task indicate that the same mechanisms that produce
border ownership modulation provide the structure for object-
based attention (Qiu et al., 2007). Two ﬁndings are important:
First, border ownership assignment occurs with or without
attention. When three objects are displayed simultaneously, one
of which is designated the target for a shape discrimination task,
border ownership modulation occurs at all three objects and is
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FIGURE 3 | Border ownership signals correlate with perceptual organization. (A, Top) This configuration of two light and two dark squares is generally
perceived as a pair of crossed bars in transparent overlay, or as a light bar with a shadow on it, or a dark bar crossed by a beam of light. However, when the corners
of the squares are rounded off, only the individual squares are perceived (A, bottom). (B) Curves show the average border ownership signals (difference between
preferred and non-preferred side responses) for the three conditions shown at the top, where a green ellipse marks the location and approximate size of receptive
fields (not part of display). Note the reversals of perceived border ownership of the marked edge between a (owned right), b (owned left), and c (owned right). The
neural border ownership signals reverse sign accordingly. (Modified from Qiu and von der Heydt, 2007.)
only slightly stronger at the attended object compared to the
ignored objects (Qiu et al., 2007).
Second, many border ownership neurons in V2 are modulated
also by attention, and there is an interesting link. In the
individual neuron, the attentional modulation depends not only
on the receptive ﬁeld being in the focus of attention, but
also on the location of the attended object relative to the
receptive ﬁeld. This can be seen clearly when looking at the
representation of the border between two overlapping ﬁgures
(Figure 4, green dashed ellipses indicate receptive ﬁeld). The
direction of occlusion determines border ownership. In the top
two displays, the right-hand ﬁgure owns the border, in the bottom
two displays, the left-hand ﬁgure. For each border ownership
condition, either the left or the right ﬁgure could be the target
of attention (yellow asterisk). The raster plots on the right
illustrate the responses of an example neuron. Comparing the
responses for the same location of attention (e.g., rows 1 and
3, or rows 2 and 4) one can see that the neuron preferred
left border ownership. However, the strength of the responses
depended also on the side of attention. Attention to the left
ﬁgure produced stronger responses than attention to the right
ﬁgure, irrespective of the border ownership condition. Thus, the
experiment revealed an unexpected asymmetry of the attention
eﬀect. In each neuron, attention enhanced the responses on
one side, but suppressed them on the other side (relative to
the mean level; the experiment did not include a ‘no attention’
condition). Note also that in the neuron of Figure 4, the
attentional enhancement was on the left side, the same as the
preferred side of border ownership. In fact, this was the rule:
across the population, the ‘enhancement side’ of attention tended
to be the same as the preferred side of border ownership (Qiu
et al., 2007).
A NEURAL GROUPING MODEL
At this point it will help to consider a simple circuit model
(Figure 5). This model was conceived to reconcile the wide
range of context integration with the short latency of border
ownership signals (Figure 1). This is a problem for realistic
modeling because, in primates, V1 and V2 are very large areas (in
fact the largest in cerebral cortex, Adams et al., 2007), and both
are retinotopically organized. Therefore, in the typical border
ownership test, the context information that indicates where
the ﬁgure is located is only represented far from the recorded
neuron (Sugihara et al., 2011). Given the slow conduction of
intracortical ﬁbers, propagating the context information within
V1 or V2 cortex would lead to conduction delays on the order
of 100 ms, in contradiction to the experimentally observed onset
of border ownership signals which occurs as early as 10–35 ms
after the response onset (Sugihara et al., 2011, see examples in
Figures 1C and 3B). The model of Figure 5 solves this problem
by postulating a feedback loop through a higher-level area.
Because several higher-level areas (such as V3, MT, V4, TEO,
etc.) are close by and since the connections to and from these
areas consist of white-matter ﬁbers which are 10-times faster than
intracortical ﬁbers (Girard et al., 2001), the expected conduction
delays in this scheme are compatible with the experimental
latencies.
The model assumes that the border ownership neurons
(‘B-cells’) receive their driving input from ordinary edge
selective neurons (simple or complex cells) and send their
main projections to speciﬁc processing stages such as V4 and
inferotemporal (IT) cortex, but also send collateral ﬁbers to
hypothetical grouping cells (‘G-cells’). The G-cells sum the input
of many B-cells and, via back-projections, enhance the responses
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FIGURE 4 | The influence of attention on the responses of a typical
border ownership selective neuron. The receptive field of the neuron
(green ellipse, not part of display) was placed on the border between two
overlapping figures. In one configuration (rows 1 and 2) this ‘occluding edge’
is owned by the square on the right, in the other configuration (rows 3 and 4) it
is owned by the square on the left. Attention was controlled by having the
monkey perform a shape discrimination task with one of the figures (according
to preceding instruction). The attended figure is marked here by a yellow
asterisk (not part of display). ‘Left’ border ownership produced stronger
responses than ‘right’ border ownership in both attention conditions.
Interestingly, the attention effect was also asymmetric. Attention on the left
figure enhanced the responses compared to attention on the right figure,
irrespective of border ownership (compare rows 1 and 2 and rows 3 and 4).
This asymmetry of the attention influence was systematic across the
population: attention enhanced responses on the preferred border ownership
side, relative to attention on the non-preferred side. (Modified from Qiu et al.,
2007.)
of the same B-cells (Figure 5, inset). The G-cells have ﬁxed
summation templates (the Craft et al., 2007, model assumes
annular templates summing ‘co-circular’ edge signals). Each
B-cell is exclusively connected to G-cells on one side, and when a
ﬁgure is present on that side, some of these G-cells will be strongly
activated and their feedback will enhance the responses of that
B-cell. Thus, the feedback from G-cells makes the B-cells selective
for ﬁgure location. The side of the G-cell connections determines
the B-cell’s border ownership preference, as indicated by arrows
on the receptive ﬁeld symbols in Figure 5. B-cells with coincident
receptive ﬁelds, but opposite side preference (pairs depicted in
blue and red) are assumed to inhibit each other. In the special case
of two partly overlapping ﬁgures, the contours would activate
G-cells on either side about equally. However, G-cells also sum
inputs from end-stopped cells (depicted in black) which respond
to occlusion features like T-junctions that indicate the direction
of occlusion (Heitger et al., 1992). In the situation illustrated in
Figure 5A this would bias the activity in favor of the red G-cell.
Experiments indicate that G-cells receive input also from other
kinds of neurons that signal direction of occlusion, e.g., neurons
selective for stereoscopic edges (von der Heydt et al., 2000; Qiu
and von der Heydt, 2005) and dynamic occlusion (von der Heydt
et al., 2003).
The main argument for predicting the circuit of Figure 5
is that border ownership preference is a ﬁxed property of the
neurons. As far as we can tell, neurons do not change their side
preference even after hundreds of intervening responses to a
variety of stimuli. Thus, a piece of contour with a given location
and orientation is represented by two groups of neurons, and, for
a given side of ownership, one group is facilitated while the other
is suppressed. Psychophysical and fMRI experiments showing
that the two groups can be adapted independently indicate that
border ownership is coded similarly in human visual cortex (von
der Heydt et al., 2005; Fang et al., 2009). This opponent coding
scheme diﬀers from other proposed ﬁgure–ground models in
which neurons represent the ﬁgure status of a region by their
activity, e.g., by enhanced/suppressed ﬁring, coherent oscillations
or ﬁring synchrony. In such coding schemes each neuron can
represent either ﬁgure or ground.
An essential feature of the grouping model (Figure 5) is that
it includes the basic circuitry needed for top-down selective
attention. We just assume that the top-down attention signal
targets the G-cell representing the object of interest, boosting
its activity relative to the other G-cells. This raises the response
gain in the corresponding B-cells. Thus, the system can enhance
large numbers of edge signals by activating just a few G-cells and
thereby select the distributed contours of an object.
With the model of Figure 5, it is easy to understand the
peculiar asymmetry of the attentional modulation found in V2
neurons (Figure 4). Because each B-cell is connected unilaterally
to G-cells on one side of it’s receptive ﬁeld, it will be enhanced
only by attention to an object on that side. Attention to an
object on the other side will enhance its opponent B-cell,
producing inhibition. Thus the observed correlation between
side of attentional enhancement and side of border-ownership
preference is a simple consequence of the connectivity in
Figure 5.
The grouping cell model has an advantage over simple
spotlight models of attention. The latter would work for
foreground objects, but not for partially occluded objects.
Because it simply selects all the edge signals under the spotlight,
focusing on the left square in Figure 5 would enhance all
the bounding contours, including the occluding contour. The
selected edges would have the shape of an L, although the object
is really a square. In contrast, in the grouping model, the G-cell
of the foreground ﬁgure (red) is activated strongly because it
receives input from the B-cells on the contour (red) as well
as from end-stopped cells responding to the T-junctions. The
strong feedback from that G-cell facilitates the red B-cell on the
occluding contour, which in turn inhibits the blue B-cell. Thus,
when attention targets the blue G-cell, it will enhance only the
blue B-cells corresponding to intrinsic contours, while the blue
B-cells on the occluding contour are suppressed. Thus, attention
can work in cluttered scenes. The model converts the diﬃcult
problem of object-based feature selection into a simple spatial
selection at the G-cell level (Mihalas et al., 2011).
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FIGURE 5 | A neural grouping model. (A) Edge-selective neurons at the Feature level activate two populations of border ownership neurons (B-cells), one for each
side of the edge. These neurons send signals to specific processing areas such as inferotemporal cortex, but they have also collateral projections to ‘Grouping cells’
(G-cells) which sum their signals, collecting edge signals in co-circular configuration. G-cells, by feedback, enhance the responses of the same B-cells (Inset, dashed
arrows). Each B-cell is exclusively connected to G-cells on one side; thus, the enhancement makes the B-cell border ownership selective for that side. This is
indicated by arrows on the receptive fields of the corresponding color. G-cells also sum responses of end-stopped cells (black) signaling local occlusion features like
T-junctions which are indicators of border ownership. Assuming that top-down attention targets the G-cells, the model also provides a parsimonious explanation of
object-based attention. (B) The model predicts that two B-cells that are connected to the same G-cell (red dashed line) will exhibit increased synchrony of firing
when both are stimulated by the same object (bound) compared to activation by different objects (unbound), whereas B-cells that do not share common G-cells
(black dashed lines) will show no increased synchrony. A recent study confirmed exactly these predictions (Martin and von der Heydt, 2015). (Modified from Craft
et al., 2007.)
EVIDENCE FOR GROUPING CELLS
Searching for direct evidence for the existence of grouping cells,
Anne Martin in my lab analyzed spiking synchrony between
border ownership cells (Martin and von der Heydt, 2015). The
grouping cell model implies that two B-cells that are connected
to the same G-cell receive the same feedback spike trains. This
should lead to increased synchrony of ﬁring in the two B-cells.
The prediction is highly speciﬁc (Figure 5C): only B-cells whose
border ownership preferences are consistent with a common
object (cells connected with red dashed lines) receive feedback
from common G-cells, but not cells with inconsistent preferences
(black dashed lines). The experiments revealed synchrony exactly
as predicted: when stimulated by a common object (‘Bound’
condition), consistent pairs showed increased synchrony, but not
when stimulated by two diﬀerent objects (‘Unbound’ condition).
In contrast, inconsistent pairs showed no synchrony in either
condition. These results are strong evidence for the grouping
cell model. We think that the activation of grouping circuits
corresponds to the representation of ‘proto-objects’ in perception
(see Discussion).
OBJECT PERMANENCE
One characteristic of perceptual objects is continuity (object
permanence). When an object is brieﬂy occluded by a foreground
object and then reappears, it is perceived as the same object.
A token seems to persist. Persistence is also apparent in
contour grouping. In Rubin’s (1921) vase-face demonstration,
for example, one interpretation is typically perceived for a few
seconds before it gives way to the other interpretation, and similar
for the Necker cube. Object organization has inertia.
Philip O’Herron in my lab searched for persistence in border
ownership signals. As the borders between vase and face regions
remain assigned to one side or the other for seconds, the question
was if border ownership signals would show similar persistence.
In one experiment, Philip presented the edge of a square in the
receptive ﬁeld of a neuron, as in the test of Figures 1A,B, but
after a brief period, the display was converted into a bipartite
ﬁeld, leaving an ambiguous edge in the receptive ﬁeld. In some
trials the initial ﬁgure presentation was on the left side, in other
trials on the right side (as in Figures 1A,B, top and bottom),
but in the end, there was the identical ambiguous edge. The
border ownership modulation persisted in the ambiguous phase
for about a second. If the initial ﬁgure presentation had been on
the preferred side, the cell kept ﬁring at a high rate, but if the
initial presentation had been on the non-preferred side, the cell
remained suppressed (O’Herron and von der Heydt, 2009).
The following experiment demonstrates the relation to
continuity in object perception (Figure 6), (O’Herron and von
der Heydt, 2011). In each trial, two overlapping ﬁgures were
presented, one of which then moved smoothly to a new position,
as indicated by oblique arrows in the top displays. In (a),
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FIGURE 6 | Object continuity and persistence of grouping. (Top left)
Two kinds of movement displays were used. In a, an inverted L shape initially
occluded part of a dark square (top). The square then moved smoothly to a
new position, resulting in the configuration shown below, which is typically
perceived as a dark square occluding a white rectangle. Thus, the perceived
direction of occlusion (border ownership) changes after the termination of
movement. In sequence b, the dark square initially occludes the white shape
and the latter then moves to a new position, resulting in the same final
configuration as in a. (Bottom left) Average border ownership signals
(difference between preferred and non-preferred side responses) for the two
display sequences. In condition b, the border ownership signal shoots up
shortly after the figures are presented (left vertical dotted line), reaching a peak
and then decaying slowly. In condition a, the border ownership signal first
turns negative, indicating ‘left’ border ownership, and then slowly drifts toward
positive values. The vertical dotted line at time 0 indicates the end of the
movement. At this time, the displays in the two conditions become identical,
the only difference being the history of events. However, the border ownership
signals remain different for at least 1500 ms. (Right) The Schematic
illustration of the events in terms of the grouping cell model. In condition b,
none of the borders changes assignment. During the movement, dynamic
cues (accretion/deletion) as well as static cues (T-junctions, compact shape of
square) define ‘right’ border ownership at the occluding contour. After the
termination of movement, the static cues continue to activate the G-cell
corresponding to the square (blue), keeping the occluding contour assigned.
In condition a, dynamic cues and T-junctions initially indicate the left figure to
be in front, activating the red G-cell most strongly. But when the movement
terminates, the dynamic cues disappear and the static cues now indicate
‘right’ ownership for the occluding contour. However, the experiment showed
that the border ownership neurons kept signaling ‘left’ for about 800 ms,
indicating that the elevated activity in the G-cell persisted (red dotted circle).
The persistence of border assignment despite the reversal figure–ground cues
indicates that the grouping mechanisms have memory (see Discussion).
(Modified from O’Herron and von der Heydt, 2011.)
the foreground ﬁgure has the shape of an inverted L and the
background ﬁgure, a square, is moved to ﬁll the concavity of the L
as shown below. In the ﬁnal conﬁguration, the square is generally
perceived as overlapping the other ﬁgure (which seems to change
from an L shape to a rectangle extending behind the square). We
were interested to learn how border ownership neurons would
represent the border between the two ﬁgures. At the beginning,
the border is perceptually assigned to the L shape, but in the
end, it is taken over by the square. How would the border
ownership signals behave? For comparison, a display sequence
was presented in which the border did not change ownership
(b). In both (a) and (b), the ﬁnal conﬁguration was identical. In
fact, everything the monkey saw was identical after the movement
stopped, the only diﬀerence being the display history.
The graph below shows the border ownership signals
(averaged over cells) recorded in the two conditions. In condition
(b), the signal turns positive after ﬁgure onset (left vertical dotted
line), indicating ‘right’ border ownership, and remains positive
(gradually weakening): the border is assigned to the square. In
condition (a), the signal initially goes negative, indicating that the
border is assigned to the L shape. At the end of the movement
(right vertical dotted line), the signal remains negative and only
slowly creeps up to positive values. Note that after time 0 the
displays in the two conditions were identical, but the two signals
stayed separate for at least 1.5 s, the end of the monkey’s ﬁxation
period (the signals would presumably converge eventually).
The sequence of events in this experiment are illustrated in
terms of the grouping cell model on the right of Figure 6. In
condition (a) the L shape strongly activates a G-cell (red) that
enhances all its edges, including the border between the two
shapes, because movement and T-junctions indicate that it is
a foreground object. At the end of the movement, the original
T-junctions disappear and two new T junctions appear indicating
the opposite relationship: the L shaped region is now likely
to be background. However, the border ownership signals for
the central border do not change immediately. Apparently, the
‘proto-object’ of the L shape (encircled with red dotted line)
persists and continues to claim the central edge as its contour.
Perhaps G-cells have intrinsic persistence and the G-cell on the
left side keeps ﬁring at a higher rate than the one on the right
side despite the cues being reversed, for about 800 ms, after which
the right G-cell slowly takes over. In condition (b), the right
G-cell (blue) dominates throughout because compact shape and
T-junctions all indicate the square to be the front object for the
entire duration of the trial.
OBJECT TRACKING AND REMAPPING
Proto-objects would be of little use if they only lived in ﬁxed in
retinal coordinates. Once contours are grouped in one retinal
location, they should stay grouped after the object moved to a new
location. When a ﬁgure is ﬂashed at one position on a display,
and subsequently at a diﬀerent position, we do not perceive two
objects, but one that moved. The system relates the actual visual
input to what has been processed the moment before. Similarly,
when the eyes make a saccade, the system should be able to relate
the new visual input to the object representations established
before the saccade.
Since we had found that the border ownership signal for
an edge persists when the edge is isolated from its context, we
wondered if the isolated edge would retain its assignment after
moving to a new location. Will the border ownership modulation
emerge at the new location? We carried out two experiments
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(O’Herron and von der Heydt, 2013). In the ﬁrst, a square
ﬁgure was presented whose contours were outside the receptive
ﬁeld of the recorded neuron. Then, the display was stopped
down to show only one edge of the square in a symmetrical
circular window. Although we did not observe responses (the
edge was not in the receptive ﬁeld), we knew that a border-
ownership signal had emerged and persisted in the neurons that
were activated by the edge. Next, a saccade was induced (by
moving the ﬁxation point) that brought the receptive ﬁeld on to
the edge. The neuron started to respond after the saccade, and
indeed, the strength of the ensuing response depended on how
the edge had been owned in the initial display! The response
was strong when it had been part of a ﬁgure on the neuron’s
preferred side, but weak when it had been owned by a ﬁgure
on the other side. Thus, border ownership signals ‘remap’ across
saccades. Similar remapping was found in the other experiment
in which the monkey kept ﬁxating and the ambiguous edge was
moved to the receptive ﬁeld.
DISCUSSION
The above review, I hope, makes a convincing argument for
early grouping mechanisms that play a fundamental role in the
vision process. Border ownership selectivity, as observed in areas
V1 and V2 of the visual cortex, is not just about assignment
of borders; it reﬂects a process that allows the system to deﬁne
and represent objects before they are recognized or sorted out by
attention. The existence of a pre-attentive stage of organization
has long been postulated by Gestalt psychologists (see Kanizsa,
1979 for an excellent explication of the Gestalt ideas). Indeed,
the main tenet of Gestalt psychology is that, what we see, and
what we attend to, are not the signals of photoreceptors, nor
the elementary features signaled by the Hubel–Wiesel ﬁlter stage,
but structures formed by an early process of organization. We
call these ‘proto-objects’. They do not correspond exactly to the
objects as projected into the eyes and may not be identical to
the ﬁnal percept that subjects report. Proto-objects reﬂect an
early guess about the object composition of a scene. In the
above experiments, neurons were tested with relatively simple
geometrical shapes. However, recent studies show that the same
neurons also signal border-ownership consistently in images of
complex natural scenes, and again, with short latency (Williford
and von der Heydt, 2014). The demonstration of grouping at
the neural signal level is perhaps the strongest and most direct
evidence for mechanisms of organization. While psychological
and theoretical studies can infer such mechanisms, we can see
them at work in the functioning visual cortex (though of non-
human primates).
I have reviewed selectively studies of border ownership coding
because they give a coherent and rather detailed picture of early
grouping in the visual cortex, but these studies by nomeans stand
alone. Figure–ground organization was ﬁrst demonstrated in V1
by Lamme (1995), who compared the responses of neurons to a
texture when it was ﬁgure with the responses to the same texture
when it was ground: the responses were enhanced in the ﬁgure
condition relative to the ground condition. This enhancement
occurs independently of the tuning properties of the neurons
(Zipser et al., 1996), and with some delay after response onset
(later than the border ownership signals). Lamme and coworkers
also attribute the response modulation to feedback from higher
centers (Roelfsema et al., 2002), but ﬁnd that attention plays
a critical role (Poort et al., 2012). Using Lamme’s paradigm
with motion-deﬁned ﬁgures, Jones et al. (2015) found strong
ﬁgure enhancement even at subcortical levels. Grouping in V1
is also apparent when monkeys perform a mental curve tracing
task (Roelfsema et al., 1998). Upon focusing attention on one
end of a curve response enhancement spreads along its entire
representation. In this paradigm the eﬀects of grouping and
attention cannot be separated. However, when a monkey is cued
to attend one element of an array, attentional enhancement
spreads automatically to other elements according to classic
Gestalt grouping rules: for example, from one bar to others that
are collinear (Wannig et al., 2011). When monkeys are required
to detect a line embedded in a random texture, grouping of
collinear line segments produces response enhancement in V1
neurons (Li et al., 2006), and this enhancement was found to
depend on feedback from area V4 (Chen et al., 2014). As shown
above for border ownership signals (Figure 6), the Lamme-type
ﬁgure enhancement also persists after the ﬁgure–ground cues
are removed (Super et al., 2001). This persistence depends on
endogenous attention, whereas border ownership signals seem
to persist even without attention (O’Herron and von der Heydt,
2009). All these ﬁndings indicate that feature grouping occurs
early in visual cortex. How exactly the results from the diﬀerent
paradigms relate to each other still needs to be clariﬁed.
Why does the system need grouping at early stages? The
prevailing concept of visual processing is the hierarchical
model according to which object recognition proceeds in
stages. Examining the ventral stream from V1 to anterior IT
cortex, one ﬁnds increasing size of receptive ﬁelds, increasing
shape selectivity and increasing position tolerance (Zeki, 1978;
Desimone et al., 1985; Tanaka et al., 1991; Connor et al., 2007;
Rust and DiCarlo, 2010). An IT neuron might respond to the
presence, in a speciﬁc arrangement, of two or three contour
segments each with a speciﬁc curvature (Brincat and Connor,
2004). Neurons at the highest level might be selective for even
more complex combinations of features. Such neurons are highly
eﬃcient in classifying objects. Isn’t that all we need to explain
object perception? I argue the answer is “No”: Classiﬁcation is not
representation. Classiﬁcation (recognition) can be based on a few
critical features which may be a small fraction of all the features
that make up an object. A car can be detected based on certain
features of shape, but the response of such a detector would not
indicate the color of the car. By contrast, a representation of an
object is a data structure that enables the system to deliberately
read out any feature of an object (at least tentatively) that might
be of interest. Because visual objects generally consist of many
visual features, it is obviously impossible to represent objects
by IT-style feature selective neurons because of the problem of
combinatorial explosion.
The function of grouping cells is diﬀerent from that of higher-
order feature selective neurons. G-cells point to the feature
neurons of an object, but do not represent the features. For
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example, when the contours of a red triangle activate a G-cell,
top-down attention mechanisms can selectively enhance its edge
signals by enhancing that G-cell and suppressing others. And
because a large fraction of the edge selective cells in V1 and V2
are also color selective (Friedman et al., 2003), the selected edge
signals will transmit not only shape, but also color information
to subsequent stages. The G-cell need not be color selective,
and its back-projections may target edge neurons of all colors
indiscriminately, but the red triangle activates only a subset of
color selective edge neurons, and only those are enhanced by
the feedback (because the feedback is purely modulatory, it does
not activate neurons that are not driven by the actual stimulus,
Figure 1F). Thus, a non-color-coded G-cell can select signals that
enable subsequent stages to compute the color of the triangle.
With simple annular fuzzy G-cell templates the model
sketched in Figure 5 eﬀectively zooms in on objects of various
shapes and localizes their contours accurately, reproducing
the basic ﬁndings of object-based attention (Egly et al., 1994;
Kimchi et al., 2007; see Mihalas et al., 2011). In this model,
the G-cells encode only location, size and the rough shape of
the object’s outline. Allowing only circular templates may be
an oversimpliﬁcation; the cortex might have a richer arsenal of
templates, perhaps including elongated shapes.
The ﬁnding (Martin and von der Heydt, 2015) of increased
spike synchrony between neurons whose border ownership
preferences are consistent with the stimulating object, even when
the neurons are widely separated in cortex, is strong evidence
for feedback grouping circuits (Figure 5). The activation of
grouping circuits might underlie the proto-objects of perception.
There are two striking parallels: First, the intricate relationship
between attentional modulation and border ownership selectivity
(Figure 3; Qiu et al., 2007) indicating that these circuits provide
a structure for object-based attention (Mihalas et al., 2011).
Second, the persistence of border ownership signals (O’Herron
and von der Heydt, 2009, 2011) parallels perceptual persistence
(Landman et al., 2003). The ﬁnding that the persisting signals
‘remap’ (O’Herron and von der Heydt, 2013) shows that these
grouping mechanisms enable the system to continue processing
of an object across movements of the retinal image, which
is the basis of object tracking (Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988)
and ‘object-speciﬁc preview beneﬁts’ in letter recognition tasks
(Kahneman et al., 1992; Noles et al., 2005). Further experiments
are needed to identify the postulated grouping circuits and
future modeling studies to show if and how persistence and
remapping can be implemented in the proposed neural grouping
scheme.
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